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Private Religious Discrimination, National
Security, and the First Amendment
Aziz Z. Huq*
INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2010, voters in the Oklahoma general election entered
the voting booth to find on their ballot six "state questions" about proposed
legal changes. The fourth, State Question 755, proposed an amendment to
the state constitution to "forbid[ ] courts from considering or using Sharia
law . . . . Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources,
the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed."' The executive director of a
group supporting the amendment, a national organization called Act! For
America, explained that American Muslims should receive this different
treatment from the courts because their legal system is inherently flawed.2
Elaborating this thought, a correspondent with The Oklahoman newspaper
explained his view that the amendment was justified because "Islam's stated
intent is to bring all of the U.S. under Sharia [law]."' State Question 755
passed with seventy percent of the vote.4 In one way, State Question 755 is
unusual. Few American state or federal statutory or constitutional provi-
sions facially distinguish between religious faiths. But it was not an outlier
in other ways. It is now a template for legislators in several other states who
have proposed or enacted similar choice-of-law rules.5 And it is not the only
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Data presented in Part II
was gathered in work with Tom Tyler and Stephen Schulhofer. Work on this essay was sup-
ported by the Frank Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund at the University of Chicago School of Law and a
Carnegie Scholars Fellowship. Thanks to the editors of the Harvard Law & Policy Review for
superlative editing.
'OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BD., STATE QUESTIONS FOR GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2010),
available at http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/sqgenlO.pdf.
2 Nicholas Riccardi, Oklahoma May Ban Islamic Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at A6.
Glover Shipp, Letter to the Editor, The Total Package, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 12, 2010, at
9A.
4 James C. McKinley Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 15, 2010, at A12.
' Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on Sharia Law: Are Bans Like Oklahoma's Nec-
essary, Constitutional, Anti-Islamic?, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2010, at 3A. Louisiana and Ten-
nessee have already enacted statutory prohibitions that cover Islamic law. See H.R. 785, 2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010), available at http://www.legis.state.1a.us/billdatalstreamdocument.
asp?did=722536; H.R. 1353, 106th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010), available at http://
www.capitol.tn.govBills/107/Bill/HB1353.pdf. As of April 11, 2011, there were forty-two
proposals in twenty states proposing prohibitions of one sort or another than would extend to
Islamic law. Bill Rafferty, Bans on Court use of Sharia/International Law Advance in Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma, GAVEL To GAVEL, April
11, 2011, available at http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/04/l l/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainter-
national-law-advance-in-alabama-alaska-arizona-florida-kansas-missouri-and-oklahoma/.
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example of a public effort to translate private concern about Islam into a
public, legal form.
State Question 755 and similar legal efforts are products of a widening
public debate about the place of Islam in the United States. On one side are
arguments that Islam is linked inherently to violence, 6 antithetical to moder-
nity,' and a "totalitarian" political force "that explicitly seeks global hegem-
ony."' Recent "homegrown" terrorist attempts supply grist for this
perspective.' 0 On the other side of the ledger are claims that Islam's core
values of "moral accountability and social egalitarianism"" fit comfortably
in contemporary American society. This side of the debate echoes with con-
cern about the vulnerability of American Muslims to private discrimination
and burdensome counterterrorism measures.12 Enactment of State Question
755 by a wide popular margin suggests the first perspective is currently as-
cending in the public mind. It also shows how private disquiet can translate
into statutory or constitutional text.
This debate is brewing at the same time that Islam has become the fast-
est growing religion in America.'" The decennial national census does not
elicit data on faith. But estimates of the nation's Muslim population range
from 1.1 million to seven million. 14 Large Muslim communities live in New
York, Chicago, Detroit, and the Dallas-Fort Worth area. State Question 755
gives tangible form to the belief that these Muslims pose a threat to Ameri-
can culture and security. More mundanely, raw demography implies that
millions of Muslims today live, work, and pray alongside Christian, Jewish,
Hindu, atheist, and agnostic neighbors. A handful of American Muslims
have been implicated in recent alleged homegrown terrorist conspiracies.
But millions more seem to participate, without chafing against legal bounda-
ries, in political debate and action. Indeed, as Charles Kurzman explains,
with "fewer than 200 Muslim-Americans . . . involved in violent plots since
6 See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF
REASON 123 (2004) ("Islam, more than any other religion human beings have devised, has all
the makings of a thoroughgoing cult of death.").
'See, e.g., BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG: THE CLASH BETWEEN ISLAM AND MO-
DERNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 159 (2001) ("To the Western observer, schooled in the theory
and practice of Western freedom, it is precisely the lack of freedom ... that underlies so many
of the troubles of the Muslim world.").
'DANIEL PIPES, MILITANT ISLAM REACHES AMERICA 14 (2003).
' Karen Greenberg, Homegrown: The Rise of American Jihad, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10,
2010, at 6.
' See STEvEN EMERSON, JIHAD INCORPORATED: A GUIDE TO MILITANT ISLAM IN THE US
486 (2006).
" REZA ASLAN, No GOD BUT GOD: THE ORIGINS, EvOLUTION AND FUTURE OF ISLAM XiX
(2005).
12 See LORI PEEK, BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11 78 (2010);
Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY
UNDER ATrACK: RECLAIMING OUR FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 167 (Richard C. Leone &
Greg Anrig Jr. eds., 2007).
" PAUL M. BARRETr, AMERICAN ISLAM: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RELIGION 8
(2007).
14 PEw RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM
11 (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf.
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9/11, most of them overseas[,] . . . credit for the low level of violence must
be due primarily to the millions of Muslims who have refrained from an-
swering the call to terrorism.""
Against this complex and contested backdrop, a short essay cannot do
justice to the debate about Islam in America. There are issues, for example,
of what assimilative demands should be placed on the minority's shoulders.
Consider, for example, the proscription of certain head coverings in France,'"
or the distinctively American compulsion that forces minorities to bear the
burden of hate speech.' 7 The mooted connection between religion and ter-
rorist violence raises other questions. Should criminal penalties be imposed
based on the state's judgment of the meaning of religious beliefs and state-
ments?'" How should the state model the relationship between religious be-
lief and violence in order to predict terrorism?" These are all complex
questions that have received insufficient attention.
This essay addresses one narrow question raised by these debates: the
relationship between private discrimination, national security, and the First
Amendment. State Question 755 is one of several recent instances in which
Islam has been publicly characterized as singularly dangerous, and where
debate has led to calls (successful or not) for government action to exclude
Muslims from certain aspects of public life or public institutions via legisla-
tion, new legal text, or other official action that places the imprimatur of the
state behind anti-Muslim sentiment. A survey of those debates and of recent
data on Muslim America suggests that ambient public animus is on the rise,
and furthermore increasingly taking the form of legal enactments. For some,
this is not problematic because new terrorism risks justify some level of
disparate treatment. For many others, any disparate burden imposed by pri-
vate discrimination is unfair and inimical to shared national values.
This debate of values is hard to resolve. So this essay takes a different
tack. It argues that there is no zero-sum trade-off between equality and se-
curity. To the contrary, recent research into policing against terrorism sug-
gests the opposite is true: this research identifies a precise mechanism
through which private discrimination against American Muslims increases
the nation's vulnerability to terrorism. The research demonstrates that the
willingness to cooperate with police of Muslim American communities is
negatively correlated with experiences of private animus. The cost of lost
cooperation is not internalized by the discriminator, who therefore has insuf-
1 CHARLES KURZMAN, THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY THERE ARE So FEW MUSLIM TER-
RORISTS 11 (forthcoming June 2011).
6 See generally JOAN W. Scorr, THE POLrrIcS OF THE VEIL (2007).
7 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1596, 1612 (2010).
'" See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterter-
rorism, 89 TEX. L. REv. 833 (2011) (identifying cases in which the government's main evi-
dence of mens rea has been religious speech).
9 See Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. L. & Soc. CHANGE 39,
43-51 (2010) (describing diverse approaches by federal and state law enforcement authorities
to the definition of "radicalization").
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ficient motivation to desist from discrimination. Private animus rather has a
negative externality in the form of security-related social losses to the nation
as a whole. Bias affects not only discrete individuals. It makes us all less
safe.
The essay further identifies one remedy to the problem. A longstanding
mechanism for managing religious differences and frictions is the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Its religion-related clauses preclude
establishments of religion and prohibitions upon the "free exercise" of relig-
ion.20 Although disarray currently characterizes Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause doctrine-and while neither Clause speaks to private action-
the Religion Clauses still have a role to play in minimizing the security-
related social costs of private religious discrimination when it is translated
into legislated form. Those constitutional provisions put a ceiling on the
pay-off from mobilizing to translate animus into official form. In cases
where groups mobilize to legislate animus, the federal courts and the Depart-
ment of Justice can use the Religion Clauses to mitigate bias and to improve
security. Constitutional law thus promises results that should be welcomed
by both those who favor deontological rights and those who prefer security.
Part I begins by canvassing evidence of a second wave of anti-Muslim
sentiment since September 2001. Part II considers the empirical evidence of
discrimination's link to security. Focusing on cases where private bias takes
the form of laws and other public enactments, Part III explains how the
Religion Clauses matter to this problem. Parts I and II are descriptive; Part
III is partially evaluative and normative. It therefore reflects my views about
religious tolerance along with the empirical status of claims about American
Muslims as vulnerabilities for counterterrorism. Others may disagree with
these views. But I hope I am candid enough that readers will quickly spot
where I have stepped off the narrow track of common ground.
I.
National polling data from the past five years suggests that a majority
of Americans have categorically negative views of Islam and their Muslim
cocitizens.21 A 2006 ABC national poll found that almost sixty percent of
respondents believed that "Islam is prone to violent extremism, almost half
regard[ed] the religion unfavorably, and about one-quarter of respondents
openly admitted to harboring prejudicial feelings against Muslims and Arabs
alike."2 2 Negative views of American Muslims appear to have become more
2U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
21 See Amaney Jamal, Muslim Americans: Enriching or Depleting American Democracy?,
in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: DANGER OR OPPORTUNITY? 89, 95 (A.
Wolfe & I. Katznelson eds., 2010) (stating that a 2005 survey showed that: "36 percent of the
American population believes Islam encourages violence; another 36 percent reported that
they have unfavorable opinion about Islam").
22 PEEK, supra note 12, at 14; see also PETER GOTTSCHALK & GABRIEL GREENBERG, IS-
LAMOPHOBIA: MAKING MUSLIMS THE ENEMY 3-4 (2008); Sherman A. Lee et al., The Is-
[Vol. 5350
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pervasive since then. An August 2010 Pew Research Center poll estimated
that 30% of Americans had a favorable view of Islam, down from an esti-
mated 41% in 2005, and that 38% had an unfavorable view of Islam in 2010,
up from 36% in 2005.23 A 2009 national Gallup poll also found a majority
of Americans reported unfavorable views of Islam.2 4 Smaller-scale experi-
mental studies yield some explanation of the dynamics underneath these
numbers. A recent study of a small (225 person) sample of undergraduate
students' views on Islam suggests that Christian and Republican identifica-
tion correlate with negative views of Muslims, while friendship with at least
one Muslim led to a "significantly" lower likelihood of holding such
views.25 Negative judgments do not solely reflect views on terrorism. One
perceptive anecdotal account of Upstate New York Yemeni communities af-
ter 9/11 observed that the attacks gave people a more general "license to
cluck about 'how those people lived' and [to comment on] 'those poor wo-
men.'"26 That is, more general disapproval of social arrangements feeds into
expressed negative attitudes toward Islam.
Ambient negative attitudes may translate into adverse actions in the
workplace.27 Between 2001 and 2003, complaints filed with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination on re-
ligious grounds against Muslims doubled.28 The labor market effects of 9/
11, however, were not temporally confined to the immediate aftermath of the
attacks. Consider for example a 2004 study testing the impact of perceived
attitudes about religion and ethnicity by sending six thousand CVs with sim-
ilar qualifications and different names to California employers. The study
found that the name "Heidi McKenzie" garnered the most positive re-
sponses and the name "Adbul-Aziz Mansour" the least.29 Between 2001
and 2005, another study found, the weekly wages of Arab and Muslim men
fell between nine and eleven percent.3 0 Government statistics support the
inference that workplace discrimination against Muslims continues to be on
lamophobia Scale: Instrument Development and Initial Validation, 19 INT'L J. PSYCH. RELIG.
92, 93 (2009); Solana Pyne, Making Enemies, VILLAGE VOICE, July 15, 2003, at 48.
23 PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC REMAINS CONFLICTED OVER ISLAM (2010), http://pew
research.org/pubs/1706/poll-americans-views-of-muslims-object-to-new-york-islamic-center-
islam-violence (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
24 PEEK, supra note 12, at 14.
25 Lee, supra note 22, at 100-01.26 
DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND ROUGH
JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR 34 (2007).
27 See MOUSTAFA BAYOUMI, How DOES IT FEEL TO BE A PROBLEM? BEING YOUNG AND
ARAB IN AMERICA 194 (2008).
28 See Pyne, supra note 22.
29 BAYOUMI, supra note 27, at 194. The difference may be in part due to perceptions of
race, not religiosity.
30 Neeraj Kaushal, Robert Kaestner, & Cordelia Reimers, Labor Market Effects of Septem-
ber 11th on Arab and Muslim Residents of the United States, 42 J. HuM. REs. 275, 276 (2007);
see also Alberto Davila & Marie T. Mora, Changes in the Earnings of Arab Men in the US
Between 2000 and 2002, 18 J. Pop. EcON. 587, 588 (2005).
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the rise. In 2002, the EEOC received 1463 bias claims from Muslims."' By
2004, the number was 697.32 In 2009, bias claims had climbed again to
1490, slightly up from the 2002 figure.3 Of course, such data is an imper-
fect proxy for a tally of discrimination. Not all claims to the EEOC are
valid. Background proclivities to report may change across time. Absent
other data, however, it is still plausible to think the data at least shows the
direction of change. This is especially plausible when the trend in employ-
ment discrimination data correlates with changing patterns of reported verbal
and physical violence against Muslims.3 4 One civil rights organization re-
ceived 1516 complaints of bias or violence for calendar year 2001, and 2652
for calendar year 2007.11 All the available evidence points to the increasing
prevalence of animus in recent years.
The increasing strength of ambient animus is captured in recent public
debates about Islam. Such debates demonstrate how private bias can take
the form of public action. That is, organized public pressure can lead to
legislative hearings,36 executive decisions, or new statutory and constitu-
tional provisions. For example, State Question 755 in Oklahoma was itself
the object of a concerted public campaign funded by private dollars. 7 The
availability of the referendum mechanism provided merely a particularly
speedy and cheap vehicle for translating anti-Muslim preferences into legal
code. The study of the resulting debates, however, presents a hard method-
ological question: Do they merely refract implicit public anxieties? Or do
they serve as catalysts for new anxieties? In which direction does the causal
arrow run? The likely answer is a bit in both directions. Absent some un-
derlying current of suspicion, a story will not take off. Having gained alti-
tude, the story then propagates ideas and feelings. Two moments of high-
profile anxiety about the place of Islam in American society from 2009-10
deserve attention: debates about an Arabic-language school in Brooklyn,
New York, and a controversy about an Islamic center in lower Manhattan.
In both cases, as with State Question 755, there was an effort to give public
3' Eve Tahmincioglu, Muslims Face Growing Bias in the Workplace, MSNBC, Sept. 13,
2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39081887/ns/business-careers/ (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Erik Love, Confronting Islamophobia in the United States: Framing Civil Rights
Activism Among Middle Eastern Americans, 43 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 401, 416 (2009) (not-
ing a spike in hate crimes against perceived Muslims following 9/11 and a subsequent decrease
in frequency after a few months); PEw RESEARCH CTR., supra note 14, at 37 (finding in 2007
"a third of Muslim Americans interviewed report that they experienced at least one hostile act
in the past 12 months").
35 Amany R. Hacking, A New Dawn for Muslims: Asserting Their Civil Rights in Post-9/
11 America, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 917, 922-23 (2010).
6 In early 2011, Rep. Peter King (R-NY) initiated a controversial series of hearings into
American Muslims, triggering protests and unease in American Muslim communities. Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, White House Seeks to Allay Muslims' Fears on Terror Hearings, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2011, at Al.
3 See Laurie Goodstein, Drawing U.S. Crowds With Anti-Islam Message, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2011, at Al (describing a national organization's role in the Oklahoma campaign).
[Vol. 5352
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animus the force of law. The timing of both cases-almost a decade after
the 9/11 attacks-also raises questions about how negative attitudes toward
a faith community either dissipate over time, or ebb and then flow again.
The first debate involves a school. In the summer of 2007, heated pub-
lic controversy erupted about the opening of the Khalil Gibran International
Academy (KGIA). KGIA was a New York City public school slated to
teach an Arabic-language dual curriculum." The school was named after a
Christian poet, founded by a specialist in multicultural education, and led by
an interfaith advisory board of rabbis, priests, and imams.3 9 Opposition to
the school initially came from parents and administrators of a public school
chosen to share space with what was meant to be the sixty-pupil, two-class-
room KGIA.40 Their criticism was amplified by national voices such as Phil-
adelphia-based Daniel Pipes, who condemned KGIA's "natural tendency to
promote Islam," and New York Sun columnist Alicia Colon, who wrote that
Osama bin Laden would be "delighted" by the school, which showed New
York "bowing down in homage to accommodate and perhaps groom future
radicals." 41 Implicit in these criticisms was an equation of Arabs and Islam
with terrorist violence. Similar criticism ensued on cable news and the
web. 42 The school principal, Yemeni-American Debbie Almontaser, eventu-
ally resigned under pressure from the state.43 The proximate cause was a
newspaper interview in which she claimed the term "intifada" translated as
"shaking off"; the larger cause was the accusation that she was a
"jihadist."44 In March 2010, the EEOC found that in pushing for Al-
montaser's departure the New York Department of Education had "suc-
cumbed to the very bias that creation of the school was intended to dispel,
and a small segment of the public succeeded in imposing its prejudices on
D.O.E. as an employer."45 Still a municipal employee, Almontaser declined
to press Suit. 46
The second debate involved what some assumed to be a mosque. In
May 2010, national public debate erupted about the plan to construct a Mus-
3 Naamah Paley, The Khalil Gibran International Academy: Diasporic Confrontations
with an Emerging Islamophobia, in ISLAMOPHOBIA, ISLAMOPHILIA: BEYOND THE POLITICS OF
ENEMY AND FRIEND 53, 53 (Andrew Shryock ed., 2010).
39 Id. at 55-57.40 Julie Bosman & Jennifer Medina, How a New Arabic School Roused the City's Old
Rivalries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at Bl. New York has other dual-language public
schools, such as the Shuang Wen Academy on the Lower East Side. Julie Bosman, Plan to
Open an Arabic School in Brooklyn Arouses Protests, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at B 1.
4' Bosman, supra note 40, at Bl.
42 See Samuel G. Freedman, Critics Ignored Record of a Muslim Principal, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2007, at B7. One example: "I hope it bums to the ground just like the towers did
with all the students inside including school officials as well." Id.
4 See Julie Bosman, Head of City's Arabic School Steps Down Under Pressure, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at Bl.
" Andrea Elliott, Bias is Found in City's Ouster of a Principal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2010, at Al.
4s Jennifer Medina, Ex-Principal of Arabic School Won't Sue City, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2010, at A24.
4 Id.
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lim community center at 45 Park Place in lower Manhattan, between Church
Street and West Broadway-roughly two blocks from the site of the former
World Trade Center. 47 Plans to develop the center began in 2006, and they
were reported on the front page of the New York Times in December 2009.48
According to its sponsors, the center-called Park51 after the initial name
"C6rdoba House" was abandoned for fear it would be connected to intima-
tions of Islamic rule-would contain a daycare, a gym and pool, art exhibi-
tions, a theater, and a restaurant, in addition to a prayer space.49 It was thus
not only, or primarily, a place of worship.
A day before a May 5, 2010, Manhattan community board meeting on
the project-and two days after an attempted terrorist attack in Times
Square-several newspapers ran stories about the "World Trade Center
Mosque." The community board began receiving "'hundreds and hundreds'
of calls, and e-mails" urging it to deny permission to build."o The catalyst
for this cataract appears to have been a blog called Atlas Shrugged run by
Pamela Geller, a conservative blogger and founder of JihadWatch.5 1 The
blog labeled the community center a "sort of like a victory lap" by Muslims
that was "[i]nsulting and humiliating," an example of "Islamic domination
and expansionism." 2 The New York Post's Andrea Peyser called the idea of
a "mosque ris[ing] over Ground Zero ... a swift kick in the teeth" to those
whose relatives died in the 9/11 attacks (incidentally turning the community
center into a mosque and moving it two blocks south).53 Geller's group pur-
chased ads on New York City buses and subway trains asserting (falsely)
that the "mega mosque" would open on September 11, 201 1.4 As with the
debate on KGIA, cable news, blogs, and websites took up Geller's cause,
accompanied by state-level and national figures such as Republican guberna-
torial hopeful Rick Lazio, presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich, and Sarah
47 Ralph Blumenthal & Sharad Mowjood, Muslim Prayers and Renewal Near Ground
Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, at Al.
48 Id.; Anne Barnard, One Project, One Faith, and Two Men Who Differ, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2010, at A20.
49 See Barnard, supra note 48, at A20 (noting name change); Anne Barnard, Islam Center
Offers Look at Its Design, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A23; Anne Barnard, For Muslim
Center Sponsors, Early Missteps Fueled a Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at Al [hereinaf-
ter Early Missteps].
o Early Missteps, supra note 49, at Al.
' See Anne Barnard & Alan Feuer, Outraged, and Outrageous, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10,
2010, at MBl; Justin Elliott, How the "Ground Zero Mosque" Fear Mongering Began, SALON,
Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war-room/2010/08/16/ground-zero
mosque-origins (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
52 Barnard & Feuer, supra note 51 at MB l; see also Michelle Boorstein, In Flap Over
Mosque Near Ground Zero, Conservative Bloggers Gaining Influence, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
2010, at Cl.
1 Andrea Peyser, Mosque Madness at Ground Zero, N.Y. POST, May 13, 2010, at 17.
54 J.V.B., Beck, Geller Push Falsehood That Ground Zero 'Mosque' Would Open on Sep-
tember 11, MEDIAMATTERS, Aug. 10, 2010, http://mediamatters.org/research/201008100011
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
[Vol. 5354
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Palin. 5 Again, many saw no light between Islam and terrorism and pushed
for official action to block the presence of Islam in the public sphere. As an
Op-Ed in the Washington Examiner explained, Park51 was "outrageous"
because "we have never, ever acknowledged that Islam, with its supremacist
cult of jihad, is the enemy threat doctrine.""6 In the eyes of these commenta-
tors, the American public sphere has no room for a facility providing recrea-
tional and support services that most communities would gladly have if that
facility is run by Muslims.
In this case, the campaign to give animus a legal form (in the form of a
zoning decision) failed. As of this writing, the Park51 project continues,
despite death threats against its sponsor" and questions about its fiscal via-
bility. 8 The debate's repercussions spread nationally. Between May 2010
and September 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union counted thirty
mosques or proposed mosques that had faced vandalism, public protest, or
concerted opposition based on objections to Islam." The Park51 debate
firmly established the status of Islam in American public spaces as a legiti-
mate subject of contestation through legal action. In Murfreesboro, Tennes-
see, for example, three residents filed a lawsuit opposing a local mosque's
expansion, arguing in court that "Sharia law is jihad . . . [and] Sharia says
the U.S. Constitution is suitable for toilet paper."6o That controversy was
unusual. It provoked the U.S. Department of Justice to file an amicus brief
in support of the mosque, arguing that Islam was a religion meriting consti-
tutional and statutory protections.6'
To recapitulate, both empirical data and trends in the national media
point to a rise in ambient negative bias against American Muslims in the past
five years. 62 Such recrudescence yields tangible setbacks in employment
" Barnard & Feuer, supra note 51, at MB 1. By contrast Mayor Michael Bloomberg re-
jected calls to move Park5 1. See Michael Barbaro, Political Leaders' Rift Grows on Islamic
Center, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at Al7.
56 Diana West, Op-Ed., A Mosque to Mock 9/11I's Victims and Families, WASH. EXAMINER,
May 16, 2010, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/node/87416.
5 See Imam's Wife Tells of Death Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A20.
5 See Kareem Fahim, Islamic Center Seeks 9/11 Recovery Grants for Lower Manhattan,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at A27.
5 See Map-Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU (last updated Oct. 2010), http://
www.aclu.org/map-nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
' Stephen George, U.S. Department of Justice Visitors Tell Muslims They Have Their
Back in the Murfreesboro Mosque Dispute, NASHVILLE SCENE, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.nash-
villescene.com/nashville/us-department-of-justice-visitors-tell-muslims-they-have-their-back-
in-the-murfreesboro-mosque-dispute/Content?oid= 1858119 (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
6 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Justice Department Files Brief in Support of
Continued Construction of Murfreesboro, Tenn., Mosque (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opalpr/20 10/October/I 0-crt- 1162.html (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
61 I therefore disagree with claims that it is "striking and reassuring" that there has been a
"lack of First Amendment litigation over the religious rights of Muslims in America" and that
this indicates that "we have something to be proud of." MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 346-47 (2008). I
see much that we should feel more than embarrassed about.
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prospects and for the collective religious practice of thousands. It also gen-
erates coordinated campaigns for official action to exclude Muslims from
the public sphere. State Question 755 merely represents the most successful
of such law-oriented efforts to date.
What explains the trend? An observer in late 2001 might well have
predicted a single-peaked distribution of negative attitudes toward American
Muslims, reaching its acme soon after 9/11 and then declining. The inverse
correlation of violent trauma, such as mass-casualty terrorism, with political
toleration toward perceived outsiders is well documented.63 Numerous stud-
ies of Americans in the past decade have demonstrated the positive correla-
tion between perceptions of terrorism and ethnocentrism.M But the effect of
exogenous shocks on toleration attitudes is generally thought to fade with
time.65 Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that the six months immediately
after 9/11 did see a spike in animus-motivated physical or verbal assaults.66
And it was surely expected that the federal government would turn to ex-
plicit use of race and ethnicity as proxies for risk only in the immediate
wake of 9/11, backing away from their explicit use soon thereafter.67 Con-
ventional accounts suggest these trends should subside. But the data sug-
gests otherwise. Negative attitudes have resurged, yielding an unexpectedly
bimodal distribution.
Explanations for this double-peak distribution are easy to hypothesize
and hard to test. One possible explanation would focus on the economic
recession's effect on the toleration of those groups seen as outsiders. An-
other account might look to the particular anxieties provoked by the Obama
presidency. Almost one in five Americans (18%) believe President Obama
to be a Muslim, seven percent more than in 2008.68 One hypothesis may
thus be that racial animus, which is no longer acceptable to express in pub-
lic, is channeled into anxieties about Islam that both attach to the President
and leak outward to other targets. A third mechanism may involve the diffu-
sion of negative views of Islam from other parts of the West. Political mo-
bilization against Muslim migration grew rapidly after 2001 in several
European nations. 69 While European trends do not generally influence
63 See, e.g., Linda J. Skitka, Christopher W. Bauman & Elizabeth Mullen, Political Toler-
ance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist At-
tacks: An Integrative Approach, 30 PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 743, 754 (2004).
' See DONALD R. KINDER & CINDY D. KAM, Us AGAINST THEM: ETHNOCENTRIC FOUN-
DATIONS OF AMERICAN OPINION 31, 44-52 (2010); Johannes Ullrich & J.Christopher Cohrs,
Terrorism Salience Increases System Justification: Experimental Evidence, 20 SOC. JUST. RES.
117 (2007); Leonie Huddy et al., Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies, 49
AM. J. POL. Sci. 593, 599 (2005).
65 See Skitka, Bauman & Mullen, supra note 63, at 754.
6 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1575-76 n.l
(2002) (collecting data).
67 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 975 (2002).
68 PEw RESEARCH CTR., GROWING NUMBER OF AMERICANS SAY OBAMA IS A MUSLIM 1
(2010), available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/fopics/Issues/Politics-andElections/
growingnumber-full-report.pdf [hereinafter PEw RESEARCH CENTER, GROWING NUMBER].
6 See JOCELYNE CESARI, WHEN ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY MEET: MUSLIMS IN EUROPE AND
IN THE UNITED STATES 29-35 (2004).
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American politics, policy entrepreneurs may leverage European develop-
ments to shape inchoate American beliefs.70 Finally, political toleration is
perhaps a function of political actors' interest in reelection. 7' Concerns about
Islam are more frequent among older and Republican-leaning voters. 72 State
Question 755, the Oklahoma anti-Sharia ballot measure, seemed to generate
higher turnout among Republican voters, a result that tracks the earlier-cited
empirical studies of the dispositional predicates of animus. 73 It is therefore
rational for Republican politicians, even absent a personal view on Islam, to
push for analogous ballot measures in 2012 in the hope of changing the
composition of the voting population that year.
Whatever the causes of the double-peaked profile of religious animus in
the United States, its effects will not be felt solely by American Muslims.
Through mechanisms that have received insufficient attention, ambient bias
also corrodes the nation's security against terrorism, making it an especially
appropriate and pressing matter for federal government consideration be-
yond Murfreesboro.
II.
All agree that concerns about terrorism after September 2001 have pro-
voked changing attitudes toward Muslim Americans. Few have asked how
those changing attitudes toward Islam influence security against terrorism.
This is an unfortunate omission. Discrimination in this domain imposes ex-
ternalities-costs to the general public welfare not borne by those who en-
gage in discrimination-by undermining the ability of domestic law
enforcement to address terrorism risks within the United States.
The mechanism here turns on the fact that police depend on public co-
operation in combating terrorism. The cooperation of Muslim American
communities is plausibly more valuable than that of the general public. New
empirical research demonstrates that social discrimination is negatively cor-
related with the willingness of minority populations to cooperate with police.
Perceptions that officials share and act on that animus likely corrode Ameri-
can Muslim populations' cooperation with law enforcement. Moreover, as
explained below, that perception also undermines non-Muslims' tendency to
cooperate. There is a negative feedback loop between private discrimination
70 Consider in this regard the role of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, formerly a Dutch parliamentarian,
now a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a vocal and eloquent critic of
Islam. Compare AYAAN HIRSI AL, NOMAD: FROM ISLAM TO AMERICA: A PERSONAL JOURNEY
THROUGH THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 247 (2010), with Nicholas Kristof, The Gadfly, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2010, at BR22 ("Hirsi Ali denounces Islam with a ferocity that I find strident,
potentially feeding religious bigotry .... ").
" See ANTHONY GILL, THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 7 (2008) (arguing
that "interests play an equally important if not more critical role [than ideas] in securing
legislation aimed at unburdening religious groups from onerous state regulations").
72 PEw RESEARCH CENTER, GROWING NUMBER, supra note 68, at 2-3.
" McKinley, supra note 4, at A12; see also supra note 22 and sources cited therein.
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and public security: terrorism provokes discrimination, which in turn in-
creases vulnerability to terrorism.
The negative feedback mechanism comprises two separate parts. First
is the claim that public cooperation, especially that of Muslim American
communities, is relevant to successful counterterrorism. The second part of
the mechanism is the asserted connection between discriminatory social atti-
tudes and that cooperation.
Take first the role of public cooperation. Most analyses of security
against terrorism focus on the role of government. But contemporary terror-
ism presents challenges that government is ill-equipped to address. As an
initial matter, any tactic that relies on surprise attacks against one of a large
number of possible targets is hard to anticipate and preempt.7 4 Terrorist or-
ganizations such as al Qaeda further draw on cultures and languages unfa-
miliar to police. Our national security institutions are also imperfect.
Failures of intelligence analysis,75 intelligence sharing,76 and resource alloca-
tion77 are disturbingly commonplace. It is therefore imprudent to rely solely
on the government and to deny the significance of private action against
terrorism. Indeed, public cooperation has already prevented attacks. Family
members have approached intelligence agencies about impending attacks
(although the agencies have sometimes failed to take their concerns seri-
ously). 78 Mosques have shunned and tried to dissuade those turning to ter-
rorism.79 Members of the general public have flagged imminent risks that
police have failed to intercept. 0 Even the FBI has underscored the message
that "upholding and enhancing the community's trust [allows] law enforce-
ment [to] counter the spread of this extremist ideology."' Public coopera-
tion is vital in practice, not just in theory, to successful counterterrorism.
The willingness of the public to supply law enforcement voluntarily
with information and assistance is not a given. In general, compliance with
legal rules under the shadow of sanctions is imperfect. This is obviously
true for legal rules meant to discourage dangerous activities. Think about
74 See ROBERTA WOHLSTETrER, PEARL HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION 3, 55- 56
(1962).
" See, e.g., Ben Feller, Obama Acknowledges More 'Red Flags' in Flight Plot, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2010, at A2.
76 See, e.g., Dana Priest & William A. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,
WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, at Al.
1 See, e.g., Walter Pincus, GAO Urges Changes in Security Budgeting, WASH. PosT, Jan.
18, 2010, at Al5.
7 See, e.g., James Gordon Meek, Failure to Communicate, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 31,
2009, at 5.
7 See Martin Evans et al., Stockholm Bomber: Family Blame Britain for Radicalisation,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/8200044/Stockholm-bomber-family-blame-Britain-for-radicalisationhtm (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
80 For example, in the May 2010 Times Square attempt, it was private actors, not the
police, who raised the crucial red flag. Corey Kilgannon & Michael S. Schmidt, Vendors Who
Alerted Police Called Heroes, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A23.
11 Carol Dyer et al., Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community Responsibility,
76 FBI/LAW ENFORC. BULL. 3, 8 (2007).
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how often people drive while intoxicated or while using a cell phone. Coop-
eration-which must be elicited without sanctions-is also likely to be pro-
duced at suboptimal levels. In the terrorism context, cooperation may be
especially difficult to elicit. Even a suspicion of involvement in terrorism
can be costly for a person's reputation. It may be more likely, for example,
that a suspect will be detained without bail and subject to onerous restric-
tions while in detention. It is plausible to believe that many people would
hesitate before subjecting a friend, fellow congregant, neighbor, or even
family member to such burdens-especially if they are unsure if their suspi-
cions are justified and know that security-focused police would treat their
concerns as certainties.
For these reasons, public cooperation in counterterrorism is more im-
portant than generally believed and more difficult to obtain. But what pro-
duces it? That is the second part of the feedback loop. A recent series of
empirical, survey-based studies of American Muslim communities and simi-
larly situated non-Muslims in New York and London casts some light on the
mechanisms that produce public cooperation against terrorism. 2 In particu-
lar, one sample of New Yorkers who identified as Muslim provides evidence
of the connection between social discrimination and cooperation. The
study's findings about private discrimination are worth outlining in detail.
The study, conducted between March and June 2009, involved a tele-
phone survey of three hundred randomly selected New Yorkers who self-
identified as Muslim. 83 The respondents were contacted by telephone and
asked a series of questions concerning their experiences and attitudes toward
policing, terrorism, and society more generally. Telephonic studies of public
attitudes toward police have been used in other surveys of public attitudes to
policing.8 4 They are limited in some respects. Responses about future coop-
eration, for example, may diverge from observed behavior. But in the ab-
sence of direct observational data of cooperation rates, they provide the best
available source of information. The data from these three hundred surveys
can be analyzed with econometric tools to draw conclusions about the attrib-
utes and experiences that are most likely to predict cooperation. Such tools
82 See Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Ef-
fects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & Soc'Y REV. 365,
379 (2010) [hereinafter Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence]; Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler
& Stephen J. Schulhofer, How Do the Purpose and Target of Policing Affect Public Coopera-
tion? A Study of Policing Crime and Policing Terrorism in Different Minority Communities,
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Huq et al., Purpose and Target)];
Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation
Against Terrorism: A Study of British Muslims,-J. EMPIRICAL L. S-ru.-(conditionally ac-
cepted 2011), available at http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edulabstract= 1757266 [here-
inafter Huq et al., Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation]. For a survey of some policy
implications of this research, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, Ameri-
can Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative,
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2011).
* For more details of the instrument and methodology, see Tyler et al., Legitimacy and
Deterrence, supra note 82, at 377-78.
" See, e.g., Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 8-12 (2006).
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allow the analyst to compare the attitudes of individual respondents within
the sample (itself representative of the Muslim population of New York
City) in order to draw inferences about correlations between attitudes and
beliefs. For example, by looking in essence for patterns within the sample,
the analyst can determine whether the belief that police are effective is cor-
related with an increasing willingness to cooperate. Or she can show how
experiences of discrimination influence the proclivity to cooperate.
Tables 1 and 2 below present descriptive data from the survey. As Ta-
ble 1 illustrates, the respondents were asked questions about the role of relig-
ion in their lives. Table 1 reports the percentages of valid responses"5 to
questions concerning the strength of Muslim identity. The data suggests re-
spondents generally self-identified strongly in religious terms.
TABLE 1: RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION
Do you agree strongly,
agree, disagree, or disa-
gree strongly that being a
How strongly do Muslim is important to
you identify as a the way you think of
Muslim, if at all? yourself as a person?
(% valid response) (% valid response)
Very strongly 57.7 Agree strongly 40.8
Somewhat strongly 25.6 Agree 47.9
Not very strongly 10.9 Disagree 9.9
Not strongly at all 4.8 Disagree strongly 1.4
Do not identify at all 1.0
Tables 2a and 2b report descriptive data concerning questions on others'
attitudes towards Muslim Americans. (The survey also contained extensive
separate questions about police treatment that are not reported here.) Specif-
ically, Table 2a presents data on experiences of disrespect. Table 2b presents
data on more specific experiences with discrimination in workplaces,
schools, the media, and interactions with government.
85 Omitting those respondents who failed or declined to respond. For these questions, this
number was zero or in single digits.
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TABLE 2A: MUSLIM AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
When you think about the major- Do you agree strongly, agree, dis-
ity Americans that you deal with agree or disagree strongly that
in your own life, do you agree or Muslims in general are free to
disagree that they respect what practice their faith in America
you believe? (% valid response) today? (% valid response)
Agree strongly 32.6 44.9
Agree 52.0 39.9
Disagree 13.4 12.5
Disagree strongly 2.0 2.7
TABLE 2B: EXPERIENCES OF FAIR AND UNFAIR TREATMENT
How fairly or
unfairly are you
treated when dealing
with authorities in How fairly or
How fairly or public institutions unfairly are you
unfairly are you such as schools, town treated in the media
treated at work halls, or other public (e.g., television, news-
and in school? institutions? papers)?
(% valid responses) (% valid responses) (% valid responses)
Very unfairly 6.8 1.7 25.0
Somewhat unfairly 15.6 13.0 23.2
Somewhat fairly 35.7 45.1 36.6
Very fairly 41.8 40.3 15.1
This data suggests that bias exists and is experienced by some Muslim
Americans in New York, but also that most of those surveyed had generally
positive views of their immediate interactions with society and of the general
public. These results are consistent with the data presented in Part I, which
also shows a minority experiencing discrimination. But the national data
evinced a higher rate of experienced discrimination than the New York data.
This may be a consequence of selection efforts for a particularly cosmopoli-
tan urban area.
How does changing experience with social discrimination interact with
cooperation? Indeed, does it have any effect at all? The variance observed
within the sample concerning respect and experiences of discrimination pro-
vides a way to test the effect of discrimination and disrespect on coopera-
tion. The survey instrument also contained questions about two kinds of
cooperation. The instrument first asked about respondents' willingness to
engage in "general" cooperation, for example attending voluntary meetings
with the police, in the future. The second asked about "specific" coopera-
tion, in essence asking if the respondents would approach the police if they
had specific information about a possible terrorism risk. Respondents an-
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swered a series of hypotheticals about arguably risky behavior, from plan-
ning an attack to reading extremist literature online.86 They were then asked
how likely they were to report that risky behavior to law enforcement.
The range of questions in the survey enabled the testing of theories to
explain cooperation. The principal findings of the research concern the ef-
fect of the police's conduct on cooperation rates and are reported
elsewhere."
To compare the relative strength of different potential explanations, it is
necessary to specify a multiple regression that includes separate indices cor-
responding to each possible explanation. 8 Table 3 excerpts from that multi-
ple regression specification the results when social discrimination is used as
an independent variable. Social discrimination is measured as a composition
of the three questions reported in Table 2b. Table 3 reports the regression
coefficient (beta) for both specific and general cooperation, which is a rough
measure of the effect of social discrimination. In addition, this table reports
the p-value, which is a measure of the likelihood that the identified relation-
ship occurred by chance. The lower the p-value is, the more confidence can
be placed in the observed correlation not being a result of the chance effect
of sampling.
TABLE 3: DOES SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION INFLUENCE
COOPERATION WITH POLICE?
Specific Cooperation General Cooperation
Regression coefficient (beta) -0.18 -0.22
Significance (p value) p < 0.05 p < 0.01
This analysis suggests that experiences and perceptions of discrimina-
tion have a statistically significant association with predicted specific and
general cooperation. In both cases, the relationship is negative: the greater
the perception of discrimination, the less likely a respondent is to cooperate.
The effect is larger (larger beta) on general cooperation than on specific
cooperation. It is important to note here that the claim made in Table 3 is
not that social discrimination is the only influence on cooperation. To the
contrary, the larger study from which this result is drawn identifies a range
of independent variables that correlate to cooperation rates. The fact that
cooperation in counterterrorism policing is complex and multicausal should
not distract from the finding that at least one important effect is found with
respect to experiences of social discrimination. The fact that social discrimi-
nation has statistically significant effects on cooperation even in a regression
86 For a full list of the risk behaviors see Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence, supra
note 82, at 390-91.
1 See id. at 386-87.
1 See id. at 380 (reporting results from that specification).
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specification that controls for demographics, discriminatory actions by the
police, religiosity, and attitudes toward the state provides support for the
conclusion that such effects are indeed robust.
Two additional findings from linked studies are worth noting. First, a
parallel study of non-Muslim Americans in New York-a control group for
the sample described above-found that when respondents believed that po-
lice discriminated against and otherwise treated unfairly Muslim minorities,
respondents were less willing to cooperate with law enforcement. 9 This
suggests that official discrimination has a spillover effect on the general pub-
lic that corrodes the willingness of people to work with police. Second, a
parallel study of British Muslims conducted in London found many of the
same correlations-but it found that social discrimination was not correlated
with cooperation in either direction.9 0 That is, ambient discrimination may
matter in the American context, but it is not possible to extrapolate out to-
ward some general, trans-historical and trans-cultural claim about the effects
of discrimination. The argument here must be confined for now to the U.S.
context.
How should the results presented in Table 3 be interpreted? This data is
evidence that a U.S. minority population's interactions with police are in part
a function of their experience with the larger society. The more exposure
they have to private discrimination, the less they trust law enforcement and
the less they volunteer information or aid. Although the correlation is clear,
and the inference of causality a plausible one, the survey instrument casts
incomplete light on the precise psychological mechanism. One explanation
may be that experience of discrimination predisposes people to distrust po-
lice. Because the general public discriminates, and because police are drawn
from the general public, it is to be expected that police will treat Muslims
unfairly. Alternatively, even if a respondent believes that the police gener-
ally treat Muslims fairly, it may be that she also believes, in a case of unfair
treatment, the probability of correction and restitution will be lower when
the rate of social discrimination is elevated. A third possibility is that expe-
rience of social discrimination damages respondents' identification with and
affective ties to society, making the goal of protection against external ter-
rorism risk less valuable. The contrary result from the United Kingdom
sample might provide some support for this last theory. In the United King-
dom, the data suggests that the Muslim minority studied has not come to
view British society as a shared project in the way their American counter-
parts have. Hence, they have no expectation of respect and do not respond
either to respect or to discrimination.
In each of these cases, importantly, the change in cooperation behaviors
is a wholly rational and non-ideological response to exogenous circum-
stances that alter the costs and benefits of such cooperation. Evidence that
cooperation rates among Muslim Americans are influenced by external cir-
8 Huq et al., Purpose and Target, supra note 82.
* Huq et al., Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation, supra note 82.
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cumstances is not evidence that this population is unpatriotic or anything of
that nature. Instead, it is evidence that Muslim Americans, like all other
Americans, respond to cues and evidence about the society around them and
their fellow citizens.
Whatever their explanation, these results suggest that private discrimi-
nation has a public cost. Discrimination impairs an essential component of
successful counterterrorism strategy. Its costs are borne not by discrimina-
tors alone, but by society as a whole. Discrimination both private and offi-
cial, in short, has security externalities. This is not the first time local bias
has imposed costs on the national welfare. During the Cold War, accurate
perceptions of racial segregation undermined American soft power and per-
suasiveness in the international arena." In that era, the federal government
undertook initiatives to mitigate externalities. 92 Today, the federal govern-
ment remains well positioned to address policy problems arising from col-
lective action problems within the several states. The security-related cost of
religious discrimination is plausibly viewed as one such problem. The ques-
tion thus arises what the federal government can do and is willing to do by
way of response.
III.
What legal and policy tools exist to disrupt the negative feedback loop
between private discrimination and insecurity? Religious tolerance (how-
ever defined) is not a constant in American history. The Constitution's Re-
ligion Clauses have coexisted comfortably with durable animus toward
Catholics, Mormons, and the Salvation Army at different times. Nor is a
whiggish expectation of ever-expanding toleration plausible. The trend line
moves in both directions. As all know, the Edict of Nantes was once re-
voked. Concerted applications of policy and legal resources are necessary to
counteract ambient discrimination. What government does in response to
private discrimination matters.
For the balance of this essay, I focus on those cases in which discrimi-
natory private action is sufficiently successful that it takes the form of an
official action or a public, legal enactment. As Section I suggested, this is
more frequent than might be thought. The KGIA debate resulted in what the
EEOC found to be an official act of discrimination. The Park51 imbroglio
almost resulted in a zoning decision against a religious actor and has cata-
lyzed a wave of efforts to use zoning laws against mosques. So State Ques-
tion 755 is only the most successful, and most naked, of recent efforts to turn
private animus into official or legal form. Such efforts, importantly, are
strong and unequivocal signals of private discrimination. Therefore, as Part
91 See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 6 (2002) ("During the Cold War years ... the diplomatic impact of race in
America was especially stark.").
92 Id. at 79-114 (documenting federal government's efforts).
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II illustrated, they will corrode the cooperation necessary for security's pro-
duction. When this happens, constitutional norms may also come into play.
In focusing on constitutional law, I do not wish to downplay the impor-
tance of social movements against bias. Surely, mobilizations and activism
are also necessary to secure toleration. Perhaps they are even more impor-
tant than constitutional law. The degree to which elected actors recognize
and act against religious discrimination is a function of constituency dynam-
ics. Where, as in Oklahoma, opposing legal recognition of religious plural-
ism secures electoral gains, tolerance for religious difference is likely to
decline. One way of addressing discrimination is therefore to raise the op-
portunity costs of intolerance via concerted political action.93 The role of
American Muslims in national politics hence will matter. Prior to 2001,
American Muslims were perceived as swing votes and courted by both par-
ties.94 In the 2000 presidential campaign, for instance, Republican candidate
George W. Bush campaigned "a half dozen times" in the Arab community
of Dearborn, Michigan.95 Whether his post-2001 security policies erased the
gains that campaigning produced for the immediate future remains to be
seen. 96 Today, the evidence suggests that 9/11 and its aftermath have accel-
erated the growth of a Muslim civil society, including youth and civil rights
organizations, 7 mosques,99 and direct partisan mobilization. 9 Its home on
the political spectrum remains uncertain.'" And it is far from clear that this
constituency will pull its weight in national or state elections. But the exog-
enous shock of 9/11 might perversely have stimulated efforts to make up for
lost time.
Private mobilization in the political process can be supplemented by
legal action under the Religion Clauses to invalidate legislated signals of
93 See GILL, supra note 71, at 79.
9 See Alexander Rose, How did Muslims Vote in 2000?, MIDDLE EAST Q. Summer 2001,
at 13. Before 2001, Muslim Americans had a generally positive view of the political process.
See IHSAN BAGBY, PAUL M. PERL & BRYAN T. FROEHLE, THE MOSQUE IN AMERICA: A NA-
TIONAL PORTRAIT 31 (2001), available at http://sun.cair.com/portals/0/pdf/the-mosque-in-
americaanational-portrait.pdf (reporting that eighty-nine percent of those interviewed in a
sample of mosques strongly agreed or somewhat agreed that Muslims should participate in the
political process).
" BARRETr, supra note 13, at 39; Niraj Warikoo, Bush Chats with Arab Americans on
Issues, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2000, at A8.
' In 2008, one survey estimated that eighty-nine percent of Muslim voters opted for the
Democratic candidate. COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, AMERICAN MUSLIMS AND
THE 2008 ELECTION: A PosT ELECTION SURVEY REPORT (2008), available at http://www.cair.
com/Portals/0/pdflPost_2008_ElectionAmericanMuslim-Poll.pdf; see also Jamal, supra note
21, at 92-93 (noting Democratic swing).
' See Kathleen M. Moore, Muslims in the United States: Pluralism under Exceptional
Circumstances, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 116, 122, 125-26 (2007).
" See Amaney Jamal, The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans:
Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness, 33 AM. POL. REs. 521, 532 (2005).
* Farida Jalalzai, The Politics of Muslims in America, 2 POL. & RELIG. 163, 192 (2009).
'0 "In most cases, Muslims cannot easily find the ideal candidate to represent both their
foreign policy interests and the moral and ethical values they uphold." Amaney Jamal &
Sunaina Maira, Muslim Americans, Islam, and the 'War on Terrorism' at Home and Abroad,
59 MIDDLE E. J. 303, 305 (2005).
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private bias that will further corrode necessary cooperation in counterterror-
ism efforts. The First Amendment caps the returns to private social mobili-
zation on grounds of religious animus because it constrains the universe of
laws that might be enacted and implemented to operationalize such animus.
It is to this use of constitutional law as a disincentive to legislating private
bias that I turn in the balance of the essay. More particularly, I use State
Question 755 as an example of what the First Amendment has to say about
the new wave of anti-Muslim animus.
Looking to law as a solution to discrimination is a contentious idea. A
growing body of scholarship casts doubt on the more ambitious claims that
constitutional lawyers have made about the transformative consequences of
their craft.o'0 Constitutional change is often best understood as the result of
conscious and long-term political investments. The Warren Court's rulings
on equality and criminal procedure are often celebrated (or reviled) as the
products of judicial activism.102 But those rulings diverged less from na-
tional majoritarian sentiments than is generally credited. 0 It nevertheless
seems premature to abandon wholesale the courts and legal doctrine as
sources of social and policy change.3" Politicians expend nontrivial re-
sources influencing the composition of federal judiciary; the media pays
short-term attention to at least some judicial decisions. It seems implausible
to disregard the courts as an important component of the larger political
constellation. Even those who see politics as more important than law
should recognize that law is one form of politics that can be very effective at
entrenching policy change. Federal judges, whose views surely reflect the
preferences of appointing coalitions, are nonetheless constrained by profes-
sional norms, by legal traditions, and by the buffering effect of life tenure.
Their inclinations, and their freedom to pursue those inclinations, will sys-
tematically diverge from those of even allied politicians.
The question here is whether constitutional law, which speaks largely to
state action, 0 has much to say about the private discrimination described in
Part I. Constitutional norms come into play when efforts are made to codify
discriminatory private beliefs into law. As we have seen, these efforts at
codification are increasingly common. State Question 755 provides a useful
example. Possible use of constitutional doctrine as a response to State Ques-
tion 755 tracks a previously successful model of social change through con-
stitutional law. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court under Chief
101 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 5 (1991).
02 STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIvisM 3-5
(2009).
103 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2004).
04 For one excellent recent study demonstrating the effect that judicial action can have in
the context of race relations, see Paul Frymer, Acting When Federal Officials Won't: Federal
Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in the U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-1985, 97 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 483, 495 (2003).
os See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883).
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Justice Earl Warren used the Bill of Rights to promulgate rules about police
procedures, racial justice, and religious free exercise. One plausible view of
these decisions is as an effort to bring regional outliers into line with norms
promulgated by national elites.'" Constitutional law thus can supply a "lev-
eling up" tool against local practices potentially far out of step with a na-
tional norm that at least some national faction defends. The question then is
whether there is a national norm that impinges on the constitutionality of
State Question 755, and whether there is sufficient interest at the federal
level to defend the norm.'07
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are in doctrinal flux. On
the one hand, the Free Exercise Clause was transformed in the 1990 case of
Employment Division v. Smith from a right against disparate impacts on re-
ligious practice into a nondiscrimination rule.'"0 Smith held that neutral laws
of general applicability are valid under the Free Exercise Clause without
regard to any burden on religious exercise.'" Smith thus established a weak
neutrality command satisfied in all but the small class of cases where legisla-
tors discriminate flagrantly. Absent a foolish or intentional violation, most
plaintiffs will face an uphill challenge. In a diverse, argumentative republic,
impermissible motives will often be easy to obscure. So it will be possible
often to target religious groups sub silentio. Compounding this problem, the
Smith neutrality rule is underinclusive. It does not apply to subsidy deci-
sions,"o following a long-standing "distinction between governmental com-
pulsion and conditions relating to governmental benefits.""' Discrimination
against religion is also permissible in the legislative distribution of accom-
modations from generally applicable laws." 2 In practical effect, the post-
Smith regime of Free Exercise jurisprudence means that only intentional
"hostility toward or neglect of particular theological perspectives" is uncon-
" See LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 488-94 (2000)
(asserting that Warren Court activism was disproportionately directed at conservative outliers
in an age of liberal political ascendancy); accord KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 117-20 (2007).
107 Cf Mark Graber, Does it Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675, 688 (2006).
"o8 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); accord Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 546 (1993) (holding that a
"law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo
the most rigorous of scrutiny").
' See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879; see also Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 536 (applying rule).
no See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (concluding that "there is room for play
in the joints" between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses) (citation omitted).
.. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 705 (1986) (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 252-53 (1963)); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04
(1983) (denying tax-exempt status to educational institutions that endorse and enforce racial
biases).
112 Compare Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005) (stating that certain ac-
commodations may still "devolve into 'an unlawful fostering of religion'") (quoting Corp. of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987)), with Amos, 483 U.S. at 338-39
(upholding exception in Title VII for religious institutions).
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stitutional." 3 And only rarely will evidence of such animus be readily
available.
On the other hand, the Establishment Clause imposes related con-
straints on the government's ability to respond to religiously inflected prefer-
ences. The two Religion Clauses are plausibly understood to operate to
order the relationship between the state and religious civil society. Precisely
what the lodestar of that relationship should be remains a topic of much
contention in the scholarship. One influential account, which in my view
captures an important strand of the case law, focuses on neutrality as the
guiding principle.Il 4 In the Establishment Clause context, nevertheless, doc-
trinal constraints on state action have been slackening in a way that parallels
expansion in the Free Exercise context. The Court has increasingly dis-
tanced itself from a longstanding three-part test requiring that state action be
characterized by a secular purpose, secular effect, and no entanglement of
state and faith."' Some elements of the old regime, such as the anti-entan-
glement rule, have been overtly abandoned."'6 On other occasions, the Court
simply ignores sectarian dimensions of a state action. When the Court in
2005 held that a Texas display of the Decalogue did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, for example, a plurality of Justices invoked tradition and
history as constitutionally sufficient justifications for a nakedly sectarian
state action."' Exempting an inchoate domain of "tradition" from Estab-
lishment Clause scrutiny, the Court more generally licenses the state to take
sides in important religious disputes provided one historically powerful ma-
jority faction has long prevailed."'
Weakening another line of Establishment Clause case law, the Court
has permitted governmental educational aid that is "neutral with respect to
religion . . . [that] provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens
who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of
their own genuine and independent private choice."" 9 This allows the state
to channel money toward domains where favored religious institutions are
already established, thereby selectively boosting those institutions. Yet
113 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 69 (2007).
" There are several different accounts of neutrality as applied to religion. See, e.g., Doug-
las Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 993 (1990). For a survey of responses to Laycock's pathmarking tripartite typology,
see Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51 (2007).
1" See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
116 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
1" See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-92 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opin-
ion) (relying on "unbroken history" as a warrant for display of the Decalogue on the grounds
of the Texas State Capitol). On the same day, the Court invalidated a display in a Kentucky
courtroom. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005). In McCreary County,
the Court "presumed . . . familiarlity) with the history of the government's actions," and
rejected the government defendants' request to elide history's significance. Id. at 866. On this
score at least McCreary County and Van Orden are consistent.
"I See Salazar v. Buono, 130 U.S. 1803, 1817 (2010).
"' Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
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even the "endorsement" test, which once commanded support, is fragile.120
Justice Scalia has already set forth an alternative view whereby government
need not remain neutral between religion and non-religion, and also can
"acknowledg[e] a single Creator."l21 Wherever the merits of these discrete
developments, they add up to major erosion of Establishment Clause doc-
trine toward some weak form of neutrality. Change under both of the Relig-
ion Clauses has a common direction toward an emasculated demand for state
neutrality.
State Question 755 provides fertile ground to examine the combined
scope and effect of those clauses today. How does that provision square
with the enfeebled neutrality command of the First Amendment? The in-
quiry must be tentative because the immediate effects of State Question 755
are uncertain. A preliminary injunction from a federal district court barring
certification of the referendum means the effects of the law cannot be di-
rectly observed.122 Question 755's terms are also not free of ambiguity. It
leaves the term "Sharia" undefined. Due to this gap, courts at the very least
have to define the ambit of this religious term, a task that raises questions
about the epistemic competences of Oklahoma judges. As might be ex-
pected, a fourteen-centuries-old tradition of religious rule making and rea-
soning that has spread to and been adapted by communities across several
continents is hardly a simple, unitary strand of writing and thought.123 How-
ever the term is eventually defined, State Question 755 nevertheless com-
mands a court to refrain from "considering or using Sharia." The
amendment thus not only prohibits courts from invoking Sharia as a refer-
ence point or as persuasive authority, it prohibits its consideration. The
scope of this rule is unclear not only because of the ambiguity of the defini-
tion of Sharia, but also because it is not clear what a prohibition on consider-
ation would cover. For example, would it extend only to explicit references
to religious law? Or would it extend to facially neutral language that tracked
the elements of a religious rule? Such uncertainty about the scope of the
amendment has immediate costs. At a minimum, noted one transactional
lawyer, the amendment "increases uncertainty and could thwart the expecta-
tions of the parties to affected transactions." 24 As a result of this uncer-
tainty, some parties will not engage in welfare-improving transactions they
would otherwise have entered.
120 See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 695-97 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing
endorsement test).
121 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 866, 88-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10- 186-M, 2010 WL 4814077, *24 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 29,
2010) (granting preliminary injunction against certification of State Question 755 by state elec-
tion board until a ruling on the merits).
mI For an introduction to Sunni jurisprudence, see generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, A His-
TORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH (1999).
For a critique of recent centralizing impulses in the jurisprudence and a call to recognize its
historical pluralism, see generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD KNOWS THE SOLDIERS:
THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN IN ISLAMIC DISCOURSE (2001).
124 Paula Burkes, Q&A with Richard Riggs, OKLAHOMAN, Nov 19, 2010, at 4B.
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Beyond uncertainty, State Question 755 likely will have a nontrivial
effect. Courts use foreign law as a result of their application of a choice-of-
law rule. Usually, the latter is found in the terms of a contract or other
private law instrument. Given that, it is plausible to read the amendment to
deny legal effect to any choice-of-law analysis that directs a court to use a
legal rule falling within the terms of the designated corpus of religious law.
The ban on use, if it has any meaning at all, covers private decisions to use
Sharia through choice-of-law clauses.
Even on that narrow reading, the amendment would entail selective
non-enforcement of a class of private contractual instruments defined on re-
ligious grounds. Consider three examples. First, a fraud action would not
lie for a false representation that meat was halal (i.e., meat that was prepared
in accordance with food preparation rules required by Islamic legal texts).'25
A contract to supply halal meat could not be enforced. By contrast, a con-
tract for kosher meat would be enforced.12 6 Second, State Question 755 may
impact the burgeoning field of Islamic finance. On some interpretations of
Islamic doctrine, interest (riba) on a loan of money is prohibited.'27 Fully
Islamic banks have existed since 1975 to provide financial services compli-
ant with this rule, and by now at least sixty nations have such institutions.'28
As of September 2008, $700 billion of assets worldwide were being man-
aged in explicitly Sharia-compliant vessels.129 Most of these assets and in-
struments explicitly reference their compliance with the riba prohibition.
State Question 755's prohibition on the use of Islamic law on its face sug-
gests these instruments may not be enforced in Oklahoma, even though a
similar financial instrument framed in nonreligious terms could be executed.
The effect of these rules on existing contracts may depend on the Contract
Clause of the federal Constitution.'10 Its effect on future contracts is uncer-
tain. Perhaps it would chill Muslim Americans from expressing their relig-
ious beliefs in contractual form. Perhaps it would propel them into
subterfuges to obtain what they see as mandated outcomes. It is also possi-
ble that courts would read the use bar to invalidate contractual language that
tracked religiously mandated outcomes without mentioning religious princi-
ples on the ground that to do otherwise would be to enable circumvention of
State Question 755's directive. Finally, it is worth noting that an Oklahoma
court would seemingly also have to deny execution of a trust or testamentary
125 Cf People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918), ajfd, 130 N.E. 921
(N.Y. 1921) (affirming conviction based on fraudulent sale of kosher meat).
126 But see Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1346 (4th
Cir. 1995) (invalidating fraud ordinance that delegated enforcement decisions to religious
scholars).
127 TIMUR KURAN, ISLAM AND MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM
7-8, 15 (2004) (noting doctrinal disagreements).
128 Id. at 9.
12 9 Savings and Souls, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2008, at 81.
30 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
262 (1827) (holding that clause banned retroactive impingement on contracts, but not prospec-
tive changes). State Question 755, however, might be styled as simply a change to available
remedies.
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instrument explicitly modeled on Islamic rules. This would have the effect
of disrupting estate planning, potentially unraveling testamentary
instruments.
In short, for a class of Americans defined by religious belief, the deci-
sion to comply with religious mandate when transacting with others would
yield a selective denial of the benefits and protections of Oklahoma's courts
across a spectrum of commercial and noncommercial transactions. State
Question 755 is a rule that on its face identifies one and only one faith tradi-
tion for this legal disability. Plainly, no other religious group is required to
bear an analogous burden. Plainly, State Question 755 has the practical ef-
fect of signaling that Muslims are the objects of state sanctioned private
discrimination. And plainly, the amendment will thereby erode the public
cooperation on which successful counterterrorism efforts often rely.
Understood in this way, the Oklahoma amendment presents an easy
question under the Religion Clauses. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a
"law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general appli-
cation must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny." 3' No compelling justi-
fication supports the naked discrimination of State Question 755. To the
extent that the state wishes to deny enforcement of private law instruments
that violate gender equality norms, Oklahoma courts already apply a public
policy exception in choice-of-law analysis.13 2 Moreover, Islamic law encom-
passes equitable as well as discriminatory versions, 33 much as American law
has historically included different views on gender and, at present, respect-
ing sexuality. It would be passing odd, however, to condemn all of Ameri-
can law on the basis of Bradwell v. Illinoisl34 or Bowers v. Hardwick,3 1 on
the theory that some parts of the law have yet to renounce entirely the perni-
cious taint of those decisions. Hence, State Question 755 is impermissibly
overbroad. At the very least, such overbreadth gives lie to claims that the
provision has a salutary, equality-related end.
Oklahoma's amendment additionally runs up against Establishment
Clause limits. In its most recent invalidation of state action on Establish-
ment Clause grounds, the Court held that the "First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion."3 6 Oklahoma voters were asked whether to "forbid[ ]
courts from considering or using Sharia law" alone; no other religious law
was mentioned.137 That is, it sought to distinguish between different sects
and impose a burden on one that applied to no other. The referendum, for
131 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
132 See, e.g., Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1034 (Okla. 2006);
Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 820 P.2d 787, 797 (Okla. 1991).
"' See generally ASMA BARLAS, "BELIEVING WOMEN" IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIAR-
CHAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE QURAN (2002).
134 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
135 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
36 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citation omitted).
m37 OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BD., supra note 1, at 7.
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this reason, falls afoul of even a weak version of the neutrality principle at
the core of both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
Perhaps anticipating problems, the amendatory language to be added to
the Oklahoma Constitution diverges from the question posed to the voters
and provides that "courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations
or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or
Sharia law."' 38 At first blush, the first sentence of this language seems to
sweep broadly but evenly on non-sectarian grounds: any legal rule derived
from any other "natio[n] or cultur[e]" would be inadmissible. On closer
inspection, however, its neutrality is illusory. Rather, this expansion of State
Question 755 raises more problems than it resolves. On the one hand, it
might be read to impose a bar on any rule derived from a faith that
originated outside the United States. Catholics and Jews would thus be dis-
abled from including faith-based rules in their contracts, while Christian
Scientists and Mormons would not. Members of the Nation of Islam and the
Moorish Science Temple, twentieth-century American offshoots of Islam,'3"
by contrast, could fairly object to the notion that their faith was foreign if the
law were applied to them.140 But such a reading of the law is implausible as
a claim about of the electorate's intentions.14 1 It is also inconsistent with the
expressed motives of Act! for America, the national organization that funded
the public campaign for State Question 755, an organization that "draws on
. . . evangelical Christian conservatives . . . and Tea Party Republicans." 42
Simply put, the extension of the prohibition to "other nations or cultures"
cannot mean what it says (and would, independently, be unconstitutional if it
did due to its arbitrary discrimination between faiths).
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that Islam, like Catholicism and Ju-
daism, is not solely the faith of other nations and cultures. It is a faith prac-
ticed daily by millions of Americans born and raised in the United States. It
is also a religious tradition that arrived before Independence, a faith that has
been practiced in the several states as long as many Christian sects (and
longer than many new sects).143 It is no more and no less foreign than Ca-
tholicism, Judaism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Anglicanism, or the Lutheran
'3 Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3, Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10- 1l86-M,
2010 WL 4814077 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2010), [hereinafter "Defs.' Resp."]. It is not clear
this linguistic shift is sufficient to save the amendment given the problems that adhere in the
ballot question. The contents of ballot questions are state action, and are therefore constrained
by constitutional limitations. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 273
(1996); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). Through State Question 755,
Oklahoma chose to single out for potential penalty one discrete and insular religious minority.
The ballot was therefore facially discriminatory
13 KAMBIz GHANEABASSIRI, A HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AMERICA 218-24 (2010).
1 In any event, denominational preferences are problematic under the Establishment
Clause. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
'4' But see Defs.' Respn, supra note 138, at 12-13 (making this argument).
142 Goodstein, supra note 37, at Al. It is surely a strike against State Question 755 that it
involves adherents to some faiths working to exclude adherents of another faith from the pub-
lic sphere.
143 See GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 140, at 15-32; EDWARD E. CuRTIs IV, MusLIMs IN
AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 5-24 (2009).
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Church. To be sure, Oklahoma could invoke a historical tradition of repug-
nance toward Islam in America, best demonstrated by slave owners who
justified the existence of slavery by claiming a need to eliminate Islam from
amongst their chattel.'" One hopes that plea from history would fail.
Whether it does or not, the contradistinction between "Islam" and
"America" is false in historical terms just as it is false as a description of
quotidian America. 14  The state of Oklahoma has no warrant in history, tra-
dition, or policy to deny the equal protection of its courts to one religious
group without any clear or remotely compelling justification.146
In my view, the First Amendment case against State Question 755 is
surprisingly simple. That does not mean it would prevail. Constitutional
doctrine, even in more stable areas than the Religion Clauses, is treacherous
ground. But the federal courts today could exercise a salutary centripetal
yank back to a desirable constitutional norm of nondiscrimination. Doing so
would track the Court's historical practice in invalidating state policies that
diverge dramatically from constitutional norms, especially where those poli-
cies impose high costs on the nation as a whole. As they did during the
Warren Court years, the courts would doubtless benefit from the spine-stiff-
ening support of the executive. The U.S. Department of Justice has inter-
ceded once in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. It could, with equal justification,
intervene in Oklahoma to make clear that the legal instantiation of animus
toward one faith (and one faith alone) violates the Constitution. Doing so
would send a clear signal to other politicians considering invocation of the
Islam card to rally votes in the 2012 electoral cycle, and perhaps might even
dissuade a few from doing so.
CONCLUSION
It is banal to observe that anti-Muslim discrimination is precipitated by
terrorism-related fears. But this is only part of the story. The discrimination
provoked by the experience of terrorism-related fear in turn increases secur-
ity vulnerabilities. This negative feedback loop benefits politicians willing
to leverage public unease, distaste, and fear for electoral gain. It also bene-
fits terrorists, who can expect to operate with a lower probability of discov-
ery. The law surely does not provide the only or the most important point of
'" GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 140, at 46-47.
115 The advocates of State Question 755 disagree and "have succeeded in popularizing the
notion that American Muslims are just biding their time until they gain the power to revoke the
Constitution and impose Shariah law in the United States." Goodstein, supra note 37, at Al.
This seems to me a culpable misdescription of reality.
'" The Court has previously invalidated, seemingly on Equal Protection grounds, popular
lawmaking that selectively imposes barriers on the ability of a single class of citizens to secure
the protection of the laws in the absence of any justification for singling out of that class. See
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado law prohibiting municipali-
ties and the state legislature from enacting sexuality-related antidiscrimination rules). More
generally, there are striking parallels between the political logic of anti-gay referenda that
proliferated in 2004 and that of State Question 755.
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leverage against this dynamic. But when animus takes official form, as is
increasingly the case, legal responses can be salvaged from current doctrine
under the Religion Clauses. Over the past decades, the protections offered
by those provisions of the First Amendment have withered, perhaps as con-
troversies over the role of religion in national politics and society have
sharpened. Yet even the emaciated Religion Clauses, which promise only a
weak kind of neutrality, provide some tools to vindicate both core rights and
security values in the current context. Consequently, the great challenge in
coming years will not be in crafting novel responses to staunch animus.
Rather, the large question is whether there exists the necessary political will
to motivate the Justice Department and, as importantly, the federal bench to
act against the dynamic anti-security effects of discrimination.
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